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Abstract One of the Accounting Law Modernization Act’s aims was to provide
a long-lasting, lower-cost, easier, and full-fledged alternative to IFRS for private
firms. While the comparability of accounting rules (i. e., the de jure comparability)
between German GAAP (HGB) and IFRS increased as a result of this reform,
related research indicates that reporting incentives play an important role in shaping
reporting practices (i. e., de facto comparability). With heterogeneous incentives
being present, it remains questionable whether de facto comparability between HGB
and IFRS firms followed the increase in de jure comparability. Using consolidated
accounts of private firms voluntarily reporting under IFRS together with variations
of matched HGB reports and output-based comparability measures in a pre-post
design including firm years from 2003 to 2011, I find that the de facto comparability
between private HGB and IFRS firms increases (decreases) from the pre- to the post-
BilMoG period for matched firm pairs belonging to similar (dissimilar) industries.
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1 Introduction
The Accounting Law Modernization Act (BilMoG) has been the largest reform of
German local GAAP (HGB)1 in the last 25 years. Traditionally, local German
accounting rules have been particularly known for being shaped by informational
needs of creditors and tax authorities, the prudence principle, the tendency towards
a lower extent of disclosures, and a considerable amount of recognition and mea-
surement options (Haller 1992, 2003; Haller and Walton 2003, p. 8). The German
legislature deemed an alignment of HGB and IFRS necessary to modernize HGB
using the BilMoG reform (German Bundestag 2008, p. 34); therefore, the similarity
of accounting rules under HGB and IFRS (i. e., the de jure comparability) increased.
For private German firms,2 IFRS rules transmitting to HGB via the BilMoG reform
could mean that the similarity of reporting practices (i. e., the de facto comparability)
to IFRS peers also increases. In other words, the de facto comparability between
private HGB and IFRS firms could follow the increase in de jure comparability.3
However, since incentives shape financial reporting choices, prior research finds
that converging rules will not always be tantamount to converging accounting
practices.4
Even if local standards become identical across firms, the de facto comparability
could remain unaffected by an increase in de jure comparability. For example, Yip
and Young (2012) find that the introduction of the IFRS reporting mandate in the
EU (via the IAS regulation) brought increases in the comparability of accounting
practices between, but less so within countries.5 A reason for this observation could
be that IFRS reporting comes at high cost and firms therefore use their reporting
discretion to avoid the new reporting requirements (Nobes 2006, p. 235; Kvaal and
Nobes 2010, p. 175). In line with this conjecture, Kvaal and Nobes (2010, 2012)
find that earlier local GAAP reporting patterns often persist under IFRS. Daske
et al. (2013) similarly find that, depending on underlying reporting incentives,
accounting standards can be adopted more or less genuinely. Relatedly, Cascino and
Gassen (2015) report that the comparability upon accounting standards adoption is
dependent on firms’ compliance incentives.
1 In this paper, “old” and “new” HGB refers to HGB before and after the BilMoG reform, respectively.
2 Following Ball and Shivakumar (2005), Burgstahler et al. (2006), and Bassemir (2012), firms are iden-
tified as private if they do not have equity shares listed on stock exchanges. It is noteworthy that for listed
German firms my research question on the similarity of HGB and IFRS reporting practices in consoli-
dated financial reports does not arise, since these firms are required to report under IFRS in their consoli-
dated financial reports from 2005 (or 2007) onwards due to the European Commission’s [EC’s] Regulation
1606/2002 (the International Accounting Standards [IAS] regulation).
3 The classification into de jure and de facto comparability follows van der Tas (1988) and Tay and Parker
(1990).
4 See, e. g., Gassen and Sellhorn (2006, footnote 10, p. 367), Daske et al. (2008), Christensen et al. (2013),
and Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) for related arguments.
5 Yip and Young (2012) find in separate regressions that similar firm pairs within countries did not or only
marginally (dependent on the respective measure in use) become more comparable due to the introduction
of the IFRS reporting requirement. However, in pooled regressions, the differences to cross-country firm
pairs are insignificant and comparability increases are generally observable.
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The German setting that I study offers an opportunity to further examine the link
between de jure and de facto comparability. Since 2003, the HGB grants private
German firms the option to prepare their consolidated financial statements following
HGB or IFRS. Since the BilMoG reform’s goal was to modernize HGB and improve
transparency by providing firms, among other things, with a lower-cost alternative
to IFRS (German Bundestag 2008, p. 1), the decision to either genuinely adopt
new standards or sticking to old reporting practices is particularly interesting in my
setting. If the costs of sincere accounting standards adoption were, as intended by
the German legislature, relatively low, firms could refrain from taking actions to
avoid new reporting requirements. Thus, even if the German legislature did not
intend to change de facto comparability between HGB and IFRS firms, effectively
providing a cheaper reporting alternative that partly resembles IFRS requirements
could increase the similarity between HGB and IFRS firms’ reporting practices. This
could particularly be true, since large audit firms’ leaning towards IFRS reporting,
improved decision making in management accounting, and debtholders’ requests for
IFRS-like reporting information also prompt this outcome.
Given its unique low-cost goal and the tension induced by both incentives for
and against an increase in de facto comparability being present, the BilMoG reform
affords a particularly interesting setting to examine comparability effects. Thus,
I examine whether the greater de jure comparability between HGB and IFRS re-
quirements after the BilMoG reform brought about an analogous increase in de facto
comparability for private firms reporting under these accounting standards regimes.
Since the BilMoG reform changed many accounting areas at once, I use output-
rather than input-based measures of de facto comparability for my empirical analy-
ses. This implies that I use the aggregate output of the financial reporting process
(i. e., net income) to compute my comparability scores, and do not focus on indi-
vidual accounting choices (e.g., the choice between FIFO and LIFO in inventory
valuation). This measurement has several advantages over input-based measures
(De Franco et al. 2011, p. 901). In particular, output-based measurement allows
commenting on the overall comparability effects brought about by the BilMoG re-
form. More specifically, to empirically examine whether the de facto comparability
between private IFRS and HGB firms changed after the BilMoG reform, I compare
the cash-flow-based “accounting system comparability” (Barth et al. 2012, 2013)
before and after the reform. To calculate this comparability measure and mitigate
concerns related to self-selection, I construct a matched sample of private IFRS and
HGB firms based on size and industry affiliation.
My results provide evidence in support of the view that comparability of account-
ing practices between private HGB and IFRS firms has significantly increased from
the pre- to the post-BilMoG period. I test the robustness of my main results by
using various model specifications, an alternative measure of comparability (“value
relevance comparability”), different matched samples, a post-BilMoG sample split
based on firms being audited by large audit firms, and an alternative sample of firms
that combines voluntary and mandatory BilMoG adopters. I find that my results are
robust to these changes in the research design.
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My findings are in line with the view that an accounting standards reform that
brings de jure comparability at low cost is likely to induce within-country de facto
comparability. Since the within-country comparability effect of mandating IFRS to
listed companies in the EU does not seem to be overly pronounced (Yip and Young
2012), my findings are particularly interesting for non-German standard setters that
consider bringing more decision-useful accounting standards to those firms in their
jurisdictions that are not already obliged to report under IFRS. Furthermore, since
my paper is the first to bring output-based comparability measurement to a setting
with private firms, it should also be of interest for prospective research on these
firms’ accounting choices. Moreover, since the ex post assessment (i. e., post-im-
plementation review) of accounting standards has spurred recent interest in research
and standard setting (IFRS Foundation 2012; ASB and EFRAG 2012; Ewert and
Wagenhofer 2012; Trombetta et al. 2012; Gross and Königsgruber 2012), my study
also contributes to this area by analyzing specific effects of an accounting standards
reform.
2 Institutional and Regulatory Background
The IAS regulation of 2002 mandates listed firms in the EU to file consolidated
financial statements following endorsed IFRS starting in 2005 (2007).6 However,
voluntary adoption has been allowed much earlier in Germany, also for private firms
in need of more decision-useful information for their stakeholders; these firms could
voluntarily adopt IFRS instead of HGB for their consolidated accounts starting in
2003 (Art. 58 para. 3 EGHGB).7 As the HGB has traditionally been a financial
reporting regime in favor of stewardship over decision usefulness, this opportunity
added an interesting layer to the accounting regime choice of private firms in Ger-
many. From 2003 until the beginning of 2009, the voluntary adoption of IFRS had
been the only means for private firms to report under a more decision-useful set of
accounting standards. However, from firm years starting on January 1, 2010 (2009),8
this situation changed, since the (major part of the) BilMoG reform of HGB became
effective (Art. 66 para. 3 EGHGB).
In the notes to the BilMoG draft law, the German legislature stated that al-
though the accounting principles that had earlier been present in the HGB re-
mained authoritative, the HGB was aimed to be transformed into a long-lasting,
lower-cost, easier, and full-fledged alternative to IFRS (German Bundestag 2008,
p. 1). To create such an alternative, the legislature deemed a modest conver-
gence with IFRS requirements necessary (German Bundestag 2008, p. 34). Op-
6 While listed firms with equity securities had to adopt IFRS from 2005 onwards, all listed firms with debt-
only securities and those already using internationally accepted (mostly US) accounting standards were not
mandated to adopt IFRS until 2007.
7 The “EGHGB” is the Introductory Act to the Commercial Code, that is, the law used by the German
legislature to change the HGB.
8 The major part of the BilMoG reform became effective in 2010. However, its minor parts (e. g., related to
the risk reporting and internal control system of listed firms) became effective in 2009, and early adoption
of the major parts also became possible from 2009 onwards.
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erationally, the German legislature planned to reduce existing accounting choices,
abandon the reverse authoritativeness principle (“tax dictates financial account-
ing”), adapt some of the existing rules, and partly develop new rules in line with
IFRS (Froschhammer and Haller 2012). Following this courses of action, the Ger-
man legislature aimed at increasing the information content of HGB financial re-
ports without undermining the HGB’s traditional accounting principles (German
Bundestag 2008, p. 34).
3 Literature and Hypothesis Development
Recent literature on de facto comparability upon introduction of IFRS requirements
generally finds that more similar accounting standards lead to greater similarity in
accounting practices (Barth et al. 2012). However, between-country comparabil-
ity is more affected than within-country comparability (Yip and Young 2012) and
compliance is an important prerequisite for increased comparability upon account-
ing standards adoption (Cascino and Gassen 2015).9 Since this literature focuses on
listed firms in an international setting, and recent input-based comparability stud-
ies even cast doubt on these results (Kvaal and Nobes 2010, 2012), it is unclear
whether comparability increases upon standards convergence are present for private
German firms. These firms’ accounting regime choice has already been investi-
gated in general (Bassemir 2012), for price-regulated industries (Pierk and Weil
2014), and linked to other earnings quality metrics than comparability (Bassemir
and Nowotny-Farkas 2015). However, de facto comparability upon accounting stan-
dards adoption of private German firms has not been addressed by researchers thus
far. It will only increase if opportunities and incentives for more similar reporting
choices exist. In this section, I address both opportunities (see Sect. 3.1) and in-
centives (3.2) for a change in de facto comparability between private German IFRS
and HGB firms after the BilMoG reform and finally develop a hypothesis for my
study (3.3).
3.1 Reporting Opportunities for a Change in De Facto Comparability
To determine whether the expectation of converged accounting practices of private
HGB and IFRS firms under new HGB can be supported from a de jure perspec-
9 Other studies emphasizing comparability effects of IFRS adoption by using mostly output-based mea-
sures of comparability are the ones by Barth et al. (2013), DeFond et al. (2011), Brochet et al. (2013),
Hahn and Sellhorn (2013), and Horton et al. (2013).
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tive, I highlight reporting areas where HGB rules became more similar to IFRS
requirements in Appendix A.10
The changes listed in Appendix A, along with other changes that were brought
to new HGB, indicate that HGB rules generally became more similar to IFRS
requirements from 2010 onwards. For example, under old HGB the capitalization
of derivative goodwill that emerges from consolidation only existed as an accounting
choice. Under new HGB, capitalization of derivative goodwill is required. Thus,
in this case, HGB and IFRS have been aligned, since the mandatory capitalization
of derivative goodwill resembles the requirements in IFRS 3.32. Additional rules
that bring IFRS and HGB accounting closer together from a de jure perspective,
e.g., are the method of capital consolidation, the general approach towards deferred
taxes, the components of the cost of inventory, the accounting treatment of firms’
own equity instruments, and the accounting for business start-up and expansion
expenses.
Although convergence of required accounting treatments of HGB and IFRS can
be observed from the rule changes induced by the BilMoG reform, HGB rules
sometimes retain differences from the respective IFRS requirements. For example,
intangible assets that are generated within the firm can now be capitalized during
the development process, which was prohibited earlier. This rule change can only be
perceived as a gradual alignment to IFRS, where development costs are required to
be capitalized when all conditions in IAS 38.57 are met. Hence, this rule change can
only increases the de facto comparability between HGB and IFRS firms if discre-
tion is exercised accordingly. Similar observations can be made for other accounting
topics affected by the BilMoG reform – HGB rules converge but are not identical to
IFRS requirements.11 For instance, differences remain for the subsequent measure-
ment of derivative goodwill that emerges from consolidation, inventory valuation as
well as pension and other provisions.
Appendix A and its examples of accounting rule changes stemming from the
BilMoG reform show that accounting choices most often became more similar to
IFRS requirements, which means that de jure comparability of HGB and IFRS rules
has generally increased due to the BilMoG reform. However, many accounting
10 Appendix A is based on information from Hayn and Graf Waldersee (2008), Kirsch (2009), Pellens
et al. (2014), PwC (2011), Selter et al. (2010), Welling et al. (2011), and Zwirner and Künkele (2009)
as well as relevant HGB and IFRS requirements. To confirm that the accounting areas that are identified
using these sources are also the accounting areas affected by the BilMoG reform, I screened the notes to
some consolidated first time adoption reports of BilMoG early adopters. This screening yielded that while
the accounting areas that seem to be most frequently affected are consolidation, deferred taxes, intangible
assets, and pension provisions, all areas mentioned in Appendix A were impacted by the reform.
11 It is noteworthy that without these remaining differences, my research question would become obsolete,
since accounting practices of private IFRS and HGB firms – assuming a sufficient level of compliance with
the newly introduced reporting requirements – would have to become more similar. Cascino and Gassen
(2015) examine the moderating role of compliance for financial statement comparability upon standard
convergence.
12 This point also suggests that any examination of de facto comparability between HGB and IFRS firms
around the BilMoG reform that solely relies on input-based measures of comparability will likely conclude
that comparability has increased in some areas but not in others. However, identifying the respective areas
with and without comparability increases could be interesting, particularly for accounting standard setters.
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choices under new HGB do not fully resemble those under IFRS.12 Moreover, the
HGB after the BilMoG reform can be regarded as a potpourri of (the majority of)
rules that reduce accounting options relative to old HGB and (a minority of) others
that introduce or at least maintain discretion in financial reporting (Müller and Kreipl
2010, pp. 318 ff.). Taken together, even if the BilMoG reform reduced accounting
options and converged HGB rules to IFRS requirements, managers still find leeway
in their reporting decisions under new HGB, also when it comes to rules revised in
the wake of the reform.
3.2 Reporting Incentives Affecting De Facto Comparability
An increase in de jure comparability is not necessarily accompanied by a similar
increase in de facto comparability. Converged accounting rules constitute a necessary
but insufficient condition for converged accounting practices. Hence, the question
arises whether private German firms also face incentives that impact similarity to
IFRS reporting.
A first reason why private German firms could report more similarly to IFRS
firms under new HGB could be based on auditors’ incentives in supporting firms
that convert to new HGB reporting. As shown by a PwC survey of executive
managers on the application of BilMoG in Germany, most medium-sized firms
involved auditors when initially adopting the newly introduced rules (PwC 2011,
p. 5). When critically discussing the role that the auditing profession plays for IFRS
diffusion, Carmona and Trombetta (2008) acknowledge large audit firms’ incentives
to promote harmonized accounting standards. Relatedly, Francis et al. (2014)
show that de facto comparability increases in auditor similarity. Ball’s (2006, p. 7)
considerations allow connecting this observation to audit quality – under a common
set of reporting requirements opinion shopping becomes more difficult for auditees,
which eases the auditing process for auditors. As about 62 % (45 %) of the firms
in my industry/size-matched (full) sample are audited by one of the five largest
audit firms in Germany, these “BIG5” auditors could either deliberately promote
IFRS-like accounting practices under new HGB to prime private German firms for
subsequent voluntary IFRS adoption or unknowingly do so because their employees
are trained to audit IFRS reports.13 In Sect. 6, I present a robustness test which
indicates that this incentive is indeed present for firms of my industry/size-matched
sample in the post-BilMoG period.
A second incentive in favor of increased de facto comparability of IFRS and HGB
firms after the BilMoG reform is based on the relation between financial and man-
agement accounting. Hemmer and Labro (2008) show that the increased focus of
financial accounting on investors’ decision making will likely change management
accounting practices. This argument could particularly be relevant in a German set-
ting, where financial and management accounting practices have traditionally been
rather separated (Jones and Luther 2005). Weissenberger and Angelkort (2011) doc-
13 Please note that although this argument is based on auditors’ rather than firms’ incentives, firms’ ac-
counting choices – particularly under subjectively new accounting methods – are likely to be affected if
auditors explicitly or implicitly promote some accounting choices over others.
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ument that German firms increasingly change from a separate to an integrated man-
agement accounting system if financial accounting numbers become more adequate
for this purpose. More specifically related to my setting, Paetzmann and Kaspereit
(2010) argue that the rule changes of the BilMoG reform facilitate value-based firm
management.14 Hence, managers of private German firms that deem IFRS adoption
too costly could strive for improved decision making in management accounting by
following information-oriented reporting choices under new HGB. Since improved
decision making is likely a management goal of both private German BilMoG and
IFRS adopters, reporting practices under new HGB could therefore converge with
IFRS practices.15
A third incentive that could lead to HGB firms reporting more similarly to IFRS
firms due to the BilMoG reform is linked to financing channels that private Ger-
man firms traditionally use. They typically develop close ties to their “Hausbank”,
which has been their main source of raising capital (Leuz and Wüstemann 2003,
p. 7). If they want to reduce the hold-up problem related to this close-tie financing
relation, firms could align their accounting method choices with the informational
needs of more distant lenders (Rajan 1992; Bassemir 2012, p. 7). Since in Ger-
many local GAAP is known to allow for earnings management via “silent reserves”
(Leuz and Verrecchia 2000), lenders in arm’s length borrower-lender relationships
are likely to demand IFRS-like information to lower information asymmetries, even
if firms are reporting under local GAAP. Hence, German HGB firms that deem IFRS
adoption too expensive may still prefer accounting choices that could have similarly
been made under IFRS.
In contrast to the incentives in favor of more similar IFRS and HGB accounting
practices for private German firms after the BilMoG reform, also incentives that
could prevent an increase in de facto comparability can be identified. First, managers
that have so far been content with old HGB accounting could face incentives to
mimic previous reporting choices rather than genuinely applying new rules. Using
terminology similar to Daske et al. (2013), these firms could be called “label”
adopters of new HGB.16 This line of reasoning is similar to Kvaal and Nobes’
14 Paetzmann and Kaspereit (2010) qualitatively assess the relevant pre- and post-BilMoG conversions
necessary to compute residual income and argue that accounting profits became closer to economic profits
under new HGB.
15 It is noteworthy that the goal of improved decision making in management accounting could also be
accomplished by adopting IFRS or IFRS for small and medium-sized entities [SMEs] instead of HGB.
However, with new HGB reporting being mandated, following respective accounting choices under new
HGB can be regarded as the lowest-cost possibility to converging financial and management accounting.
In contrast, IFRS for SMEs can be considered a higher-cost alternative, since in this case firms would have
to prepare a consolidated report under HGB and an additional report under IFRS for SMEs. Preparing
consolidated reports under full IFRS voluntarily does not require dual reporting; because of its greater
variety of reporting changes compared to old HGB, it can still be considered more costly than reporting
under new HGB (see also the related argument in German Bundestag (2008, p. 1), that refers to new HGB
as a lower-cost alternative to IFRS).
16 Note that I refer to the term “label adoption” introduced by Daske et al. (2013) although my use of
this term deviates from their paper. Daske et al. (2013, p. 501) are explicitly not claiming that “serious
adopters” (label adopters) are (not) experiencing capital-market effects because of their strict (lack of)
compliance with the new accounting standards adopted. They rather define serious adopters as firms whose
reporting incentives change with a new set of standards.
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(2010, p. 175) observation that upon transition to IFRS firms strive to follow pre-
IFRS practices – presumably to minimize transition costs (Nobes 2006, p. 235).
Moreover, even after several years of IFRS usage, firms tend to maintain their initial
accounting policies that were inspired by local GAAP (Kvaal and Nobes 2012).
If practices of label adoption dominated around the BilMoG reform, comparability
between private HGB and IFRS reporters would not increase.17 A second reason
why private HGB firms may not report more similarly to IFRS firms after BilMoG
adoption could be based on their unfamiliarity with subjectively new accounting
methods – particularly since my research design relies on reports filed in the first
years of mandatory BilMoG reporting.
3.3 Hypothesis on De Facto Comparability Effects of the BilMoG Reform
Although the BilMoG reform is supposed to reduce accounting choices and mod-
estly align HGB with IFRS requirements, most converged accounting areas become
more similar but maintain both dissimilarities to IFRS requirements and reporting
discretion. Managers could try to use these dissimilarities and the remaining lee-
way to report more similarly to or differently from managers of IFRS firms due
to the existence of both incentives for and against more similar HGB and IFRS
reporting of private German firms after the BilMoG reform. Hence, with some rea-
sons pointing to higher and others to lower comparability, it ultimately remains an
empirical question which of the two conjectures prevails. However, given that the
German legislature succeeded in providing a low-cost alternative to IFRS reporting,
the avoidance of new accounting methods should not be the prevalent motive of
private German firms upon BilMoG adoption. Thus, I expect that the incentives that
likely lead to more similar reporting of private German HGB and IFRS firms prevail
and test the following hypothesis (stated in its alternative form):
The de facto comparability of private IFRS and HGB firms increased after the
BilMoG reform became effective.
17 Since I only examine the overall comparability of accounting practices, comparability changes in my
setting can stem from HGB firms becoming more or less comparable with serious or label adopters of
IFRS. This is particularly true as international studies show that low enforcement or a lack of compliance
incentives can result in IFRS adoption remaining ineffective (e. g., Christensen et al. 2013; Cascino and
Gassen 2015) and private German IFRS adopters not being subject to the enforcement process established
for mandatory IFRS adopters in the EU from 2005 onwards. However, the majority of private German
IFRS firms genuinely complying with their reporting standards regime is not a prerequisite for observing
comparability effects in my study. It may be noted, though, that I cannot differentiate between these
different explanations (i. e., private German HGB firms becoming more similar to serious or label adopters
of IFRS) for observed comparability effects.
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4 Research Design
4.1 Comparability Measurement
The output-based comparability measurement that was introduced by De Franco
et al. (2011) and is similarly used in my paper, attempts to capture de facto finan-
cial statement comparability by relating outputs from the financial reporting process
(net income in my case) to economic events. With respect to measurement, Barth
et al.’s (2012) paper that builds on De Franco et al.’s (2011) measurement is most
closely related to mine. They create an accounting system comparability measure
and examine the similarity between financial reporting of IFRS adopters all over
the world and US GAAP firms. Similarly, Yip and Young (2012) also use a mod-
ified comparability measure based on De Franco et al. (2011) to examine cross-
and within-country comparability in financial reporting after the introduction of the
IFRS reporting requirement in 17 European countries. As a methodological inno-
vation, they distinguish a “similarity facet” from a “difference facet” by arguing
that comparability means that “[...] similar things look more alike without making
different things look less different” (Yip and Young 2012, abstract) and forming
matched samples of firms from similar and different industries.
Different to the output-based measurement that I use, input-based measures of
de facto comparability are based on observations of specific accounting choices and
often aggregate these choices into an index.18 Both output- and input-based measure-
ment of de facto comparability has notable downsides. Input-based measurement
struggles with the selection of accounting choices that affect comparability, the way
these choices are weighted when measuring overall comparability, different ways
that firms use to implement the same accounting choices in the cross-section, and
holding economic events constant across sample firms (De Franco et al. 2011,
p. 901). In contrast, output-based measurement treats the reporting process like
a black box that links earnings to economic events. While output-based compara-
bility measurement is arguably preferable if overall comparability effects are in the
center of interest, the exact sources of these comparability effects remain unclear.
Translating this general criticism on output-based measurement of de facto com-
parability to my study, observed comparability effects cannot easily be ascribed to
18 Two recent studies focusing on accounting standards adoption by using input-based comparability mea-
surement are those by Kvaal and Nobes (2010, 2012). They find that national reporting patterns remain
present even if the requirement to report under a common accounting standards regime such as IFRS ex-
ists (Kvaal and Nobes 2010) and that these practices remain persistent even after some years have passed
(Kvaal and Nobes 2012). Methodologically, they investigate 16 individual accounting choices (i. e., inputs
to the financial reporting process) of firms from five different countries. Their findings are therefore sub-
ject to the limitations that they neither examine whether overall comparability has been affected by these
individual accounting choices nor whether sample firms were affected by similar or different economic
events.
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specific accounting topics that changed from old to new HGB (e.g., those listed in
my Appendix A).19
Since the BilMoG reform has been the largest reform of HGB in the last 25 years
that affected many accounting areas at once, the focus on output-based measurement
that enables commenting on the joint effects of all accounting choices of private firms
before and after the reform seems to be suitable. However, the majority of output-
based comparability measures in use rely on market data as proxy for economic
events. Since market prices are not available for private firms, it is necessary to
rely on other means of capturing economic events for my study’s comparability
measurement. As an alternative to market-based proxies, cash-flow-based proxies
are used in the literature (e.g., De Franco et al. 2011; Barth et al. 2012, 2013;
Cascino and Gassen 2015; Hahn and Sellhorn 2013). Barth et al. (2012) transfer the
empirical measurement of financial statement comparability proposed by De Franco
et al. (2011, pp. 899 ff.) to their setting. Among other things, they use a cash-flow-
based measure that does not rely on market prices and therefore is suitable for the
calculation of comparability scores for private German firms.
4.2 Identification Strategy
My identification strategy is based on a pre-post setting before and after the BilMoG
reform became effective. This mandatory adoption setting is mainly chosen over
an alternative setting that could be grounded in early BilMoG adoption for two
reasons. First, the decision to early adopt an accounting standards regime is a cost-
benefit decision for each potential early adopter (Cuijpers and Buijink 2005; Daske
2006). Thus, looking at the voluntary adopters that chose to early adopt the main
parts of the BilMoG reform in 2009 (or 2010, if their fiscal year deviated from
the calendar year)20 is likely to be prone to selection bias (Heckman 1979; Greene
2012, pp. 916 ff.). Since the comparison of voluntary IFRS and BilMoG firms
had created a unique setting with voluntary adopters being included in more than
one group examined, a voluntary adoption study in my setting would have posed
a special challenge for the application of the HGB and IFRS firm-pair matching
19 It is also noteworthy that even if I use (in accordance with Barth et al. 2012) future cash flows as a proxy
for economic events and current earnings as a proxy for the financial statement outputs, it is – with respect
to the difficulty to link single accounting choices to overall comparability effects – not essential for my
study in which way each accounting choice affects next period’s cash flows. It is rather important how the
plethora of accounting choices made by HGB firms and their joint effect on future cash flows changed due
to the BilMoG reform relative to accounting choices of IFRS firms with similar characteristics.
20 The only HGB firms that still had the option to choose between old and new HGB in 2010 were those
with fiscal year-ends being unequal to the calendar year, since the major part of the BilMoG reform became
effective for firm years starting after December 31, 2009 (Art. 66 para. 3 EGHGB).
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(or an alternative solution based on Heckman’s two-step estimation procedure).21
Second, the option to early adopt the main parts of the BilMoG reform was an
infrequent choice, which was often made by banks, insurance, and real estate firms.22
As a result of these arguments in favor of a mandatory adoption setting, solely
mandatory adopters are part of my main sample.23
To calculate the comparability metrics in use, a matched sample is needed. Since
voluntary IFRS adopters are compared to firms that have to report under HGB, the
construction of a matched sample is also a way to mitigate self-selection bias. In
my main analyses, for each combination of the first two digits of Standard Industrial
Classification [SIC] core codes and years in the final sample, firms are matched
based on total assets similarity. This prioritization of industry/size-based matching
follows Barth et al.’s (2012, footnote 8, p. 74) line of reasoning. My industry/size-
based matched sample is constructed similar to Barth et al. (2008, p. 479): For each
IFRS firm year, the difference in total assets of all HGB firms in the same (two-
digit SIC) industry is computed. Of the available HGB firms per industry and year
(i. e., those HGB firms that have not been assigned to another IFRS firm earlier), the
one with the smallest total assets difference is assigned as a match for the respective
IFRS firm. This procedure is continued until all IFRS firms have been assigned
a matched HGB firm. The matching is (as all matching procedures employed in my
study) executed for each sample year separately. Finally, my industry/size-based
matched sample comprises 541 firm pairs. Other matched samples are employed in
my robustness analyses, which are detailed in Sect. 6.24
As mentioned earlier, private German firms are allowed to adopt IFRS instead
of HGB in their consolidated financial reports since 2003. Hence, the pre-BilMoG
years in my study are the years 2003–2009, while the post-BilMoG period contains
the years 2010 and 2011. Since the BilMoG introduction happened fairly recently, it
is noteworthy that my post-period is relatively short and that I therefore provide early
21 The underlying selection problem becomes apparent when considering the composition of matched
samples in my study. I use all my matched samples to match firm years from the (larger) group of HGB
firms to the (considerably smaller) group of IFRS firms. The goal of these matching activities is to find
HGB firms that are reasonably similar to IFRS firms. Now, if both firms reporting under old and new HGB
are present in the group of HGB firms, this group is no longer homogeneous. The result of the matching of
IFRS and HGB firm years including both old and new HGB firm years in the group of HGB firms would
be that some matches included IFRS and old HGB firms while other matches included IFRS and new HGB
firms. Hence, the heterogeneity in the group of HGB firms would ultimately lead to the matched pairs in
the matched sample also being heterogeneous. These differences between the matched pairs would bias my
results, since the readiness to adopt a set of rules that is more similar to IFRS from a de jure perspective
could be indicative of early BilMoG adopters being more similar to IFRS firms – even apart from the
BilMoG reform; such an ex ante higher comparability in one of the two groups of HGB firms would distort
my pre-post comparison.
22 The distribution of many BilMoG early adopters in the financial industries is aggravated by the fact that
all of my measures to calculate comparability between HGB and IFRS firms are based on accounting data
(as market data is missing for private firms) and that banks, insurance firms, and real estate firms cannot
be compared to firms from other industries when it comes to their financial statement structure or their
revenue generation process.
23 Please note that I also conducted analyses for a sample including early BilMoG adopters; the results of
using this alternative sample are discussed in Sect. 6.
24 In addition to my industry/size-based matching procedure, I employ a propensity score matching as
well as a “mismatching” procedure that pairs firms from different industries.
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evidence on the effects of new HGB. In most of my analyses, the pre-post setting
compares the years 2003–2009 (i. e., my pre-BilMoG period) with the years 2010
and 2011 (i. e., my post-BilMoG period).25 However, to test if the financial crisis
year 200926 in the pre-period drives the results, the accounting system comparability
differences are alternatively calculated by solely comparing all other years in the
pre-BilMoG period, the years 2003–2008, with the post-period. Furthermore, I also
estimate one version of these comparability differences including year-fixed effects
in the relevant regressions to control for unobserved heterogeneity between the years
of the pre- and the post-period, respectively. A last estimation includes firm- and
industry-level growth measures to control for exogenous economic downturns. All
these means of controlling for time trends yield very similar results than the initial
analysis. Hence, my results are not driven by such time- and crisis-related effects.
4.3 Sample Selection
From all firm years belonging to consolidated accounts of German firms in the Bu-
reau van Dijk [BvD] Amadeus database (version: January 2014) between 1998 and
2013 (30,700 firm years of 4,876 firms), 31 firm years belonging to firms with short
fiscal year ends as well as 12 remaining duplicate firm years are excluded. Then,
4,965 firm years belonging to firms with listed equity are excluded.27 Since the listing
status is a static item in the BvD Amadeus database, I use the following procedure
to prevent misclassifications: I create a quasi-time-series variable that is extracted
from static items of older version of the BvD Amadeus database. Here, I use val-
ues from respective database version from 2003–2013 whenever such values are
available and only keep static values from the initially used database version (Jan-
uary 2014) elsewise. For the listing status, this procedure yields 15,159 time-series
firm-year observations extracted from older database versions, while 10,803 static
observations from the initially used database version (January 2014) are retained.28
25 In the pre- (post-) BilMoG period, total assets data from 2002 to 2008 (2009 and 2010) is required for
scaling purposes, the accounting system proxy (net income) is observed from 2003 to 2009 (in 2010 and
2011), and the economic event proxy (operating cash flows) is observed from 2004 to 2010 (in 2011 and
2012). In the year 2006 (2011), e. g., data from 2005 (2010) is used for scaling, the accounting system
proxy is observed in 2006 (2011), and the economic event proxy is observed in 2007 (2012).
26 Even though the most recent financial crisis is often linked to the years 2008 and 2009, inspections of
descriptive statistics on firm-based, industry-based, and macroeconomic growth measures yield the insight
that my sample firms’ consolidated financial reports are, on average, only affected in 2009.
27 However, unambiguously identifying private firms in the BvD Amadeus database is not possible because
firms with listed debt (bonds) but no listed equity are recorded as unlisted firms. Since firms with bonds and
without listed equity are required to report under IFRS from 2007 on, these firms do not voluntarily decide
about reporting under IFRS. Relying on descriptive statistics presented by Bassemir (2012, pp. 17 f.) I do
not expect such firms to substantially bias my results, since they do not occur frequently in the German
setting that I use.
28 Other static variables in the BvD Amadeus database for which this procedure has been similarly used
are: the SIC code (15,076 time series, 10,876 static), the auditor (13,023 ts, 12,536 s), the number of foreign
subsidiaries (15,159 ts, 9,996 s), and the number of foreign shareholders (15,159 ts, 9,648 s). Since the
other variables used in my analyses are already available in panel form, they are directly taken from the
BvD Amadeus database version of January 2014.
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Table 1 Sample Selection Procedure for the Full Sample (before any Matching)
Firm years Firms
Firm years (firms) belonging to consolidated accounts of German firms
in the BvD Amadeus database (version: January 2014) between 1998 and
2013
30,700 4,867
– Remaining firm years (firms) belonging to firms with short fiscal years
(fiscal years with less than 12 reporting months)
(31) (0)
– Remaining duplicate firm years (firms) (12) (0)
– Remaining firm years (firms) belonging to firms with listed equity (4,965) (486)
– Remaining firm years (firms) between 1998 and 2002 or between 2012
and 2013
(1,915) (42)
= Relevant firm years (firms) in the BvD Amadeus database between
2003 and 2011
=23,777 =4,339
– Remaining firm years (firms) with missing industry (SIC-code) infor-
mation
(10) (3)
– Remaining firm years (firms) belonging to banks, insurance, and real
estate firms (SIC1it = 6)
(11,369) (1,874)
– Remaining firm years (firms) of voluntary BilMoG early adopters in
2009 and 2010
(304) (55)
– Remaining firm years (firms) of HGB firms that had no obligation to
report under BilMoG in 2010 (because of alternative fiscal year-ends)
(56) (1)
– Remaining firms years (firms) with missing CFit+1 information (neces-
sary for comparability measure calculations)
(2,544) (210)
– Remaining firm years (firms) with missing NIit information (necessary
for comparability measure calculations)
(1,637) (265)
= Firm years in full sample (which comprises all firms involved in the
matching procedures)
=7,857 =1,931
CF is an operating cash flows variable. NI is net income scaled by lagged total assets. SIC1 stands for the
first digit of a firm’s SIC core code. More details on the variable definitions are listed in Appendix B.
After dismissing firm years of listed firms, scaling some variables with lagged
total assets, and saving the 2012 operating cash flow values that are used as firm-
specific economic event proxies for the sample years from 2011, all firm years other
than those belonging to the 2003–2011 period are excluded (remaining: 23,777
firm years of 4,339 firms). Of the remaining firm years, 10 are excluded as SIC-
code information is missing. 11,369 firm years are excluded because they belong
to 1,874 firms in the banking, insurance, or real estate industry so that 12,398 firm
years of 2,462 firms remain. Then the remaining 304 firm years of 55 BilMoG
early adopters are excluded. Additionally, the remaining 56 firm years of the HGB
firms with alternative fiscal year-ends in 2010 that had no obligation to report under
BilMoG and did not decide to voluntarily report under new HGB are excluded,
since these firms potentially distort my pre-post comparison. Finally, 2,544 (1,637)
observations are excluded because future operating cash flow (current net income)
information is missing.
All in all, my full sample comprises 7,857 firm years belonging to 1,931 private
firms and their consolidated accounts between 2003 and 2011. The sample selection
procedure is summarized in Table 1.
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Practically all data that I use is obtained from the BvD Amadeus database. How-
ever, the voluntary BilMoG early adopters in 2009 and 2010 have been collected
from the German Federal Gazette (“Bundesanzeiger”, www.bundesanzeiger.de).29
This search identified 500 “suspect” firms that potentially adopted BilMoG early in
their consolidated financial report in 2009 and 100 firms that potentially did so in
2010. Examining each of these 600 suspect reports, I could identify 87 voluntary
early adopters of new HGB in consolidated reports of 2009 and 21 in reports of
2010. I then matched the collected data on early adoption to the data obtained from
the BvD Amadeus database. 96 of these 108 early adopting firms could also be
identified as private firms in the database, 95 of which having SIC code information




For my industry/size-based matched sample and the variables of interest, Tables 2
and 3 present the numbers of observation, the means, the medians, the standard
deviations as well as tests for mean and median differences between HGB and IFRS
firms separately for the pre- and the post-BilMoG period. Table 4 presents Pearson
(under the diagonal) and Spearman (above the diagonal) correlations.30
The descriptive statistics in Tables 2 and 3, e.g., show that about 60 %
(~55 %/~53 % of the HGB firms pre/post, ~69 %/~72 % of the IFRS firms pre/
post) of the matched firms’ consolidated reports are audited by one of the “BIG5”
audit firms in Germany (BDO, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, or PwC), over
35 % (~25 %/~27 % HGB, ~46 %/~51 % IFRS) of the matched firm-year obser-
vations belong to firms with at least one foreign owner, more than 20 % (~18 %
HGB, ~29 %/~28 % IFRS) of the matched firms’ subsidiaries are foreign ones, and
almost 35 % (~22 % HGB, ~46 %/41 % IFRS) of firms in the industry/size-matched
sample have the corporate form of an “Aktiengesellschaft” (AKTGit = 1). From the
requirement to issue consolidated reports and these descriptive statistics, it becomes
clear that my study deals with private firms of larger size that are unlikely to be
representative of the population of all private German firms. When it comes to
average differences between HGB and IFRS firms, such differences exist in the pre-
and the post-BilMoG period. However, it is worth noting that – due to the matching
29 For this purpose, the following steps were necessary: First, using the keywords (1) “BilMoG”, (2)
“Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz”, (3) “Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetzes”, (4) “Modernisierung
des Bilanzrechts”, (5) “Bilanzmodernisierungsgesetzes”, (6) “Bilanzmodernisierungsgesetz” and (7) “Bil-
MoGs” full-text searches in consolidated reports 2009 (with fiscal year-ends on December 31, 2009) and
2010 (with fiscal years ending between December 31, 2009, and December 31, 2010) were conducted in
the German Federal Gazette.
30 To counteract the problem of multiple comparisons and to control for the increased probability of mak-
ing type-I errors, the significances in the correlation table are adjusted using the Bonferroni correction.
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to form the industry/size-matched sample – significant differences do not exist with
respect to SIZEit.31
An observation from the descriptive statistics might be that the number of ob-
servations is not equal for all variables listed. This is due to the fact that not all
variables are used in all of my matching procedures.32 The propensity score match-
ing [PSM]33 used in the robustness analyses is subject to tighter data restrictions
than the other matched sample procedures. Since the logit regressions employed in
PSM require information on all independent variables – also those not being part
of the sample selection procedure for the industry/size-matched sample (AKTGit,
BIG5it, CAP_INTit, FO_OWNit, FO_SUBit, and LEVit) – the number of observations
is reduced compared to my main analyses. I also do not require all firm years of my
full sample to have nonmissing values with respect to the model specification that
adds growth measures to the comparability estimation procedures.
Table 5 exhibits the industry composition of the firm years in all my (matched)
samples by showing the distribution of the first digit of the SIC core code among
the firms included in the respective samples. In the full sample, the greatest amount
of firm years belong to the service industries (~32.34 %), closely followed by the
manufacturing industries (~32.07 %), and firm years belonging to firms from the
wholesale and retail trade industry (~16.43 %). Table 5 also depicts the indus-
try composition separately for IFRS firm years in each sample (in brackets). It
may be interesting to note that in the industry/size-matched sample the industry
composition of the HGB subsample exactly resembles the industry composition
of the subsample of IFRS firms. Thus, if industry is considered the most impor-
tant determinant of firm similarity,34 my industry/size-based matching is preferable
to PSM.
5.2 Accounting System Comparability Results
My main results are those related to the cash-flow-based accounting system compa-
rability of private IFRS firms and industry/size-matched HGB firms – once calcu-
lated in the pre- and once in the post-BilMoG period. These results are depicted in
Table 6.
Panel 1 of Table 6 presents the standard comparison, where the accounting system
comparability regressions practically resemble those in Barth et al. (2012) and the
pre-period is defined to include all years 2003–2009. These seven years of data in
the pre-period are compared to the years 2010 and 2011, i. e., the first two years
of mandatory BilMoG reporting for HGB firms. The mean, the median, and the
31 In the PSM sample that is used in the robustness analyses (see Sect. 6), such average differences in
means do not exist for any of the variables used in the PSM regressions.
32 I use an industry/size-based matched, a propensity score matched, and a “mismatched” sample. While
the industry/size-based matching is explained in Sect. 4.2, the other matching procedures are discussed in
Sect. 6.
33 In this study, PSM is used to abbreviate “propensity score matching” as well as “propensity score
matched”.
34 See, e. g., Bhojraj et al. (2003) for a related argument.
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SIC1 stands for the first digit of a firm’s SIC core code. A first digit SIC code of 0 (SIC1it = 0) means that
a firm belongs to the agriculture, forestry, or fishing industry; SIC1it = 1 stands for mining or construction
firms; SIC1it = 2 and SIC1it = 3 stand for manufacturing firms; SIC1it = 4 stands for transportation firms
or public utilities; SIC1it = 5 stands for wholesale or retail trading firms; SIC1it = 6 stands for banks,
insurance companies, or real estate firms (which are excluded from the sample since these firms cannot be
compared to firms from other industries when it comes to their financial statement structure or their revenue
generation process; see Table 1 for the sample selection); SIC1it = 7 and SIC1it = 8 stand for service firms;
and SIC1it = 9 stands for public administration firms. More details on the variable definitions are listed in
Appendix B.
standard deviation of the accounting system comparability metric are significantly
smaller in the post- than in the pre-period. With the accounting system comparability
measure being a measure of dissimilarity, these results foster the interpretation
that the comparability of consolidated financial reports of private German HGB
and IFRS firms increased from the pre- to the post-BilMoG period. Thus, the
comparability effects of the BilMoG reform seem to be in line with the legislative
actions undertaken (i. e., aligning some of the existing and developing new HGB
rules in accordance with IFRS requirements).
In Panels 2, 3, and 4 of Table 6 results of very similar comparisons to Panel 1 are
presented. However, in each of these cases, the estimation of the cash-flow-based
accounting system comparability is adapted to control for a possible bias introduced
by the sample period including years that are associated with the most recent fi-
nancial crisis. Even though this crisis is often linked to the years 2008 and 2009,
a screening of firm-based (variable GROWTH), industry-based (IND_GROWTH) and
K
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Obs. Prediction Mean Median Std. Dev.
Panel 1: Pre-BilMoG period includes all years from 2003–2009 (Model 1)
Before
BilMoG
2003–2009 379 0.0812 0.0812 0.0053
After
BilMoG




2003–2011 541 Neg. –0.0770*** –0.0776*** –0.0026**
Panel 2: All years but the year 2009 (crisis year) in pre-BilMoG period (Model 2)
Before
BilMoG
2003–2008 266 0.0860 0.0863 0.0066
After
BilMoG






428 Neg. –0.0818*** –0.0827*** –0.0039**
Panel 3: Year-fixed effects in regressions (Model 3)
Before
BilMoG
2003–2009 379 0.1353 0.1353 0.0069
After
BilMoG




2003–2011 541 Neg. –0.1311*** –0.1319*** –0.0040*
macroeconomic35 growth measures yields that my sample firms’ consolidated finan-
cial reports are notably affected by the crisis-related economic downturn only in
2009. Hence, a first way to control for potential crisis effects is to exclude matched
firm pairs belonging to this year from the statistical estimation procedures and
tests.
Since the year 2009 is moreover the year where minor parts of the BilMoG reform
became effective and the year where most BilMoG early adopters adopted new HGB,
excluding this year can also be seen as a check whether comparability increases are
driven by these effects. The results of excluding the year 2009 from the pre-BilMoG
period are depicted in Panel 2, where accounting system comparability values from
private German HGB and IFRS firms in the years 2003–2008 are compared to
values from 2010 and 2011. The results are interchangeable with those of the initial
analysis presented in Panel 1.
As a second alteration of the initial comparison in Panel 1, I estimate accounting
system comparability for the pre- and the post-period again, now including year-
fixed effects in the regression equations. These year-fixed effects control for any
unobserved heterogeneity between different years; therefore, this analysis can be
35 See GDP growth between 2003 and 2011 on the website of the German Federal Statistical Office.
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Obs. Prediction Mean Median Std. Dev.
Panel 4: Growth controls in regressions (Model 4)
Before
BilMoG
2003–2009 372 0.0810 0.0811 0.0081
After
BilMoG




2003–2011 530 Neg. –0.0464*** –0.0464*** –0.0046***
In Model 1, I estimate regressions in the pre-BilMoG period including all firm years from 2003–2009. In
Model 2, firm pairs in the year 2009 are left out of the pre-period regressions. Model 3 (Model 4) repeats
the estimation procedures of Model 1, however with year-fixed effects (GROWTH and IND_GROWTH)
included into the regressions.
Cash-flow-based accounting system comparability is computed following Barth et al. (2012, their Ap-
pendix A, pp. 90 ff.). It is computed in six steps: First, the relation between subsequent year’s operating
cash flows and net income is estimated separately for HGB and IFRS firms. Second, for each set of firms,
i. e., private German firms reporting under IFRS and private German firms reporting under HGB, within-
sample fitted cash flows are computed by using the regression coefficients obtained in the first step. Third,
for each set of firms, between-sample fitted cash flows are computed by using the regression coefficients
from the other set of firms’ first step regressions. Fourth, again separately for HGB and IFRS firms, the
absolute value of the difference from fitted cash flows from the second and third step is calculated. Fifth,
for each matched firm-year pair (composed of one HGB and one IFRS firm), the difference obtained in step
four is averaged. Finally, the cash-flow-based accounting system comparability is the mean, the median,
and the standard deviation of the average differences obtained in the fifth step, respectively.
*, **, *** denotes that the difference in means, medians, or standard deviations is significant at the 10 %,
5 %, and 1 % level, respectively. In accordance with Barth et al. (2012, 2013), t-tests are used to test for
differences in means, while Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are used to test for differences in medians.
Significance tests for standard deviations use the empirical distribution obtained from a bootstrapping pro-
cedure adapted from Barth et al. (2012, 2013). For each test, I first randomly assign each observation
of the matched sample as either an IFRS or a HGB observation. For each designated IFRS observation,
I randomly assign a designated HGB observation as its match. Then, I randomly assign each firm pair
to groups of firm pairs with an approximately equal number of observations. The number of groups is
dependent on the particular test. If I compute significances for the standard comparison (Panel 1) or the
comparisons in Panel 3 and 4, I randomly assign firm pairs to nine groups, each one standing for one
of the years in this comparison (i. e., mimicking the 2003–2011 year classification). Here, seven groups
stand for the pre- and two groups for the post-period. If I test for significances in the comparison without
the crisis year in the pre-period (Panel 2), I assign firm pairs to eight groups (mimicking the 2003–2008
vs. 2010/2011 dichotomy). After that, I calculate the difference in standard deviations of the accounting
system comparability metric for the randomly assigned groups of observations in the (fictitious) pre- and
post-period. I obtain the empirical distribution of the difference by repeating this procedure 1,000 times,
with replacement. * (**, ***) indicates that the observed sample difference exceeds 900 (950, 990) of the
differences from the bootstrapping procedure.
seen as an attempt to disentangle the comparability effects that I examine from any
time trends that solely exist either in the pre- or the post-BilMoG period. Since
the pre-period includes the first years of mandatory IFRS adoption of listed firms
(following the IAS regulation), years affected by the financial crisis, and the first year
of voluntary BilMoG adoption, this alteration attempts to strengthen the association
between the BilMoG reform and the observed comparability increases. Panel 3 of
Table 6 shows that after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity between the years
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in the pre- and the post-period, the comparability increase of private German HGB
and IFRS firms remains present, even if the significance of the standard deviation
difference is reduced.
As a last way of mitigating the effect that time trends and particularly the most
recent financial crisis could have on my results, I included firm- and industry-level
growth controls – i. e., the variables GROWTH and IND_GROWTH36 – into the
accounting system equations, so that potentially biased estimates of the coefficients
on NI are avoided. Other than that, the estimation and test procedures follow the
initial analysis. The results are very similar to those presented in Panels 1, 2, and 3.
While the mean and the median accounting system comparability decreases from
the pre- to the post-period are significant at the 1 %-level in all four panels of Table 6,
the standard deviation decrease is only significant at the 1 %-level for the analysis
presented in the fourth panel; however, in panel(s) 1 and 2 (3), the standard deviation
decrease is still significant at the 5 % (10 %) level. Explanation attempts for this
somewhat weaker result for the standard deviation of the cash-flow based accounting
system comparability metric could be the following: Even though the HGB and the
IFRS regimes generally became more similar on average (which results in more
similar means and medians), the BilMoG reform also introduced and maintained
accounting options, some of which are not existent under IFRS (see Sect. 3.1 and
Appendix A for details); moreover, since my post-period is limited to the first two
years of new HGB reporting and I therefore present early evidence on the effects
of the BilMoG reform, transition effects could weaken the results; and this standard
deviation result could also be driven by the different sample sizes in the pre- and
the post-period.
6 Robustness Analyses
6.1 Value Relevance Comparability
In addition to the accounting system comparability, I compute a different, but also
cash flow- and output-based, measure of comparability and test whether comparabil-
ity differences between the pre- and the post-period are also present for this measure.
The value relevance comparability has also been introduced by Barth et al. (2012)
and its version based on future cash flows as a proxy for economic events is used in
this robustness analysis. This metric is based on separate regression estimates of the
effect of current net income (and industry controls) on future cash flows in the pre-
and the post-BilMoG period for both HGB and IFRS firms. The value relevance
comparability is then computed as the absolute value of the pre-post difference in
adjusted R² differences. The results on the value relevance comparability for the
industry/size-based matched sample are presented in Table 7.
36 Please note that in the analyses that also use GROWTH and IND_GROWTH in the comparability regres-
sions, the observations in the full sample reduce from 7,857 to 7,780. In the industry/size-based matched
sample (which consists of 541 firm pairs in my main analyses), 530 firm pairs are available for these tests.
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Table 7 Value Relevance Comparability Before and After the BilMoG Reform (for the Industry/Size-
Matched Sample)
Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
HGB firms, pre 0.0598 0.0639 0.0596 0.043
IFRS firms, pre 0.1343 0.1475 0.1499 0.1336
HGB firms – IFRS
firms, pre
–0.0745* –0.0836* –0.0903** –0.0906**
HGB firms, post 0.0793 0.0793 0.0816 0.062
IFRS firms, post 0.0974 0.0974 0.0968 0.131
HGB firms – IFRS
firms, post
–0.0181 –0.0181 –0.0152 –0.0690
Post – pre, change in
abs diff
Neg. –0.0564* –0.0655* –0.0750** –0.0216
Model information: Firm pairs: 541 428 541 530
Pre-BilMoG
period:
2003–2009 2003–2008 2003–2009 2003–2009
Post-BilMoG
period:
2010–2011 2010–2011 2010–2011 2010–2011
In Model 1, I estimate regressions in the pre-BilMoG period including all firm years from 2003–2009. In
Model 2, firm pairs in the year 2009 are left out of the pre-period regressions. Model 3 (Model 4) repeats
the estimation procedures of Model 1, however with year-fixed effects (GROWTH and IND_GROWTH)
included into the regressions.
Cash-flow-based value relevance comparability is estimated following Barth et al. (2012, their Ap-
pendix A, pp. 90 ff.). In Models 1 and 2, it is the adjusted R² difference from the following regression and




(δc ⋅ d_SICc i t) + εi t+1
CF is an operating cash flows variable. NI is net income scaled by lagged total assets. SIC1 stands for the
first digit of a firm’s SIC core code. For each but one first digit of SIC codes c occurring in the sample and
for each firm i, d_SIC1 takes the value of one if the first digit of the firm’s SIC code is equal to c or zero
otherwise. More details on the variable definitions are listed in Appendix B.
To test for significances of the value relevance comparability metric differences, I use a bootstrapping
procedure adapted from Barth et al. (2012, 2013). First, I randomly assign observations of the matched
sample as either an IFRS or a HGB observation. For each designated IFRS observation, I randomly assign
a designated HGB observation as its match. Then, I randomly assign firm pairs to groups, dependent on
the analysis conducted. If I compute significances for Models 1, 3 or 4, I randomly assign firm pairs to nine
groups, each one standing for one of the years in this comparison (i. e., 2003–2009 vs. 2010/11). If I test
significances for Model 2, I assign firm pairs to eight groups (mimicking the 2003–2008 vs. 2010/2011
classification). To test for differences in adjusted R²s, I estimate the (nested and full model) regressions
for the (fictitious) pre- and post-period for designated IFRS and HGB firms and compute the relevant
adjusted R² differences. I repeat this procedure 1,000 times, with replacement. Significance is based on
the frequency of observing an adjusted R² difference greater than or equal to the tabulated difference. *
(**, ***) indicates that the observed sample difference exceeds 900 (950, 990) of the differences from the
bootstrapping procedure.
The value relevance comparability is – as the accounting system comparability
– estimated for the standard comparison 2003–2009 versus 2010/11 (Model 1), the
comparison without the year 2009 in the pre-period (Model 2), the comparison in-
cluding year-fixed effects in the regression equations (Model 3), and the comparison
including all years from 2003–2011 in combination with firm- and industry-level
growth variables in the regression equations (Model 4). Even if the results of the
Model(s) 1 and 2 (3) are only significant at the 10 %- (5 %-) level and significant
results are even missing for Model 4, the negative post-minus-pre changes in ab-
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solute differences also point to comparability increases in consolidated accounts of
private HGB and IFRS firms from the pre- to the post-BilMoG period.
6.2 Different (Mis-)Matched Samples
As mentioned earlier, a one-to-one matching is both a prerequisite for the accounting
system comparability measure calculation and a means of alleviating econometrical
concerns related to self-selection due to voluntary IFRS adoption of private German
firms. While I use an industry/size-based matched sample in my main analyses,37 my
first alternative matched sample is constructed using PSM.38 Here, I estimate logit
regression for each sample year with the dependent variable being an IFRS dummy
and the following independent variables: AKTGit, BIG5it, CAP_INTit, FO_OWNit,
FO_SUBit, LEVit, SIZEit, and first-digit-SIC-based industry-fixed effects.
For my second alternative matched sample, I am returning to the idea stressed by
Yip and Young (2012) that comparability does not only entail the notion of similar
firms reporting more similarly but also the notion of dissimilar firms not producing
more similar accounts. To test if the BilMoG reform only increased comparability
for similar firms and not also for different ones, I form a mismatched sample (Yip
and Young 2012, p. 1775) where manufacturing firms (i. e., firms with the first digit
of SIC codes being equal to 2 or 3) under one accounting regime under consideration
(i. e., HGB or IFRS) are paired, again using industry affiliation and size similarities
(similar to the main matched sample), with service firms (i. e., firms with the first
digit of SIC codes being equal to 7 or 8) of the other regime, respectively. If the
BilMoG reform only increased comparability between similar firms, the accounting
system and value relevance comparability differences in this mismatched sample
should not show consistent comparability increases. Please note that after each of
my matching procedures, the quality of the matches is examined and low-quality
matches are excluded.39
The results on the cash-flow-based accounting system and the value relevance
comparability of all (mis-)matched samples are summarized in Table 8.
37 See Sect. 4.2 for details on my industry/size-based matching procedure.
38 Ideally, such a PSM would be, similarly to the matching of the initial industry/size-based matched sam-
ple, carried out separately for each two-digit SIC/year combination. Since the low number of observations
in my sample does not allow doing so, I estimate a matching equation for each year under consideration.
In general, PSM is not considered as my primary means of matching, since Barth et al. (2012, footnote
8, p. 74) assess it quite critically. They argue that a matching solely based on industry and size is prefer-
able to PSM, since insignificant coefficients in the estimation of the PSM equation are otherwise likely to
introduce noise and ultimately yield poorer matches.
39 In my main industry/size-based matched and the mismatched sample, the quality of matches is put to test
by calculating the ratio of the smaller to the larger total assets value of proposed firm pairs and excluding
those matches that exhibit a ratio smaller than 50 % (Yip and Young 2012, p. 1774). To control for the
quality of the matches in PSM, I proceed like Gassen and Sellhorn (2006, p. 375) and define a caliper of
0.1, meaning that all differences in propensity scores between matched IFRS and HGB firms are required
to lie below 10 %. In the industry/size-matched (PSM; mismatched) sample, 655 (608; 484) firm pairs
belonging to 572 (526; 461) distinct firms are initially matched, while only 541 (525; 445) pairs of 520
(500; 450) firms remain after low-quality matches are excluded.
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Table 8 Accounting System and Value Relevance Comparability Results for the Difference between the
Pre- and the Post-BilMoG Period and all Samples
Panel 1: Pre-BilMoG period includes all years from 2003–2009 (Model 1)
Accounting Syst. Comp. (after – before) Industry/size PSM Mismatched
Mean –0.0770*** –0.0766*** 0.0043***
Median –0.0776*** –0.0765*** 0.0032***
Std. Dev. –0.0026** 0.0000 0.0044***
Value Relevance Comp. (after – before) –0.0564* 0.0044 0.0561
Panel 2: All years but the year 2009 (crisis year) in pre-BilMoG period (Model 2)
Accounting Syst. Comp. (after – before) Industry/size PSM Mismatched
Mean –0.0818*** –0.1071*** 0.0165***
Median –0.0827*** –0.1071*** 0.0155***
Std. Dev. –0.0039** –0.0001 0.0031***
Value Relevance Comp. (after – before) –0.0655* 0.0018 0.0509
Panel 3: Year-fixed effects in regressions (Model 3)
Accounting Syst. Comp. (after – before) Industry/size PSM Mismatched
Mean –0.1311*** –0.0614*** –0.0722***
Median –0.1319*** –0.0613*** –0.0733***
Std. Dev. –0.0040* 0.0004 0.0034**
Value Relevance Comp. (after – before) –0.0750** 0.0045 0.0475
Panel 4: Growth controls in regressions (Model 4)
Accounting Syst. Comp. (after – before) Industry/size PSM Mismatched
Mean –0.0464*** –0.0243*** 0.0043***
Median –0.0464*** –0.0245*** 0.0035***
Std. Dev. –0.0046*** 0.0010** 0.0023***
Value Relevance Comp. (after – before) –0.0216 0.0088 0.0278
Details about the empirical tests presented in this table are depicted in the notes to Table 6 and Table 7.
Table 8 shows that the results in the PSM sample are close to the results computed
for the initial industry/size-based sample, at least for the mean and the median of
the accounting system comparability. In contrast to the earlier results, the standard
deviations of the accounting system comparability measure are not showing com-
parability increases after the BilMoG reform. Also concerning the value relevance
comparability, the PSM sample does not display significant comparability increases.
However, since the results on this metric are also not overly strong in the industry/
size-based matched sample, this lack of significance does not change my initial
conclusions.
The results in the mismatched sample generally point to significant compara-
bility decreases among dissimilar firms in the post-BilMoG period (however, with
significant results for the value relevance comparability measures missing). This is
in line with the BilMoG reform not only increasing the comparability of consoli-
dated financial reports between similar IFRS and HGB firms but also decreasing the
comparability between dissimilar IFRS and HGB firms.
K
Schmalenbach Bus Rev (2016) 17:423–460 449
6.3 Sample Split Based on the BIG5 Auditor Classification
As described in Sect. 3.2, incentives of large audit firms to promote harmonized
accounting choices together with the frequent involvement of BIG5 auditors at HGB
firms’ BilMoG implementation could lead to HGB firms making accounting choices
that could have similarly been made under IFRS in the post-BilMoG period. To test
whether this line of reasoning can be supported for my main matched sample, I used
BIG5it to classify each of the HGB firms in the industry/size-matched sample in the
post-period, i. e., the sample period where the BilMoG-implementation guidance
would affect reporting choices, into those that were audited by one of the BIG5
audit firms and those that were not.40 The results of this post-period sample split,
which are reported in Table 9, show that, on average, HGB sample firms that
were audited by a BIG5 audit firm are more comparable to their respective IFRS
matches, which is reflected in lower means, medians, and standard deviations of the
accounting system comparability metric.
6.4 Analyses Including BilMoG Early Adopters
When forming my full sample, I excluded firms that voluntarily adopted new HGB
in 2009 or 2010 – mainly due to self-selection concerns. However, I additionally test
whether my results are robust to including these firms. In this case, the early adopters
are not simply added to the industry/size-matched sample; they are rather added
to the full sample and given the same chance as all other HGB observations to be
matched to an IFRS firm year. Following this procedure, the newly matched industry/
size-based sample ends up including 19 firm years from 10 firms that voluntarily
adopted BilMoG early.41
The results on the cash-flow based accounting system comparability and value
relevance comparability in the newly composed industry/size-matched sample in-
cluding BilMoG early adopters are very similar to the corresponding results for the
original industry/size-matched sample that are presented in Table 6 and Table 7.42
The accounting system comparability results exhibit no notable differences, while
the value relevance comparability results are also similar, however weaker when it
comes to significance levels.43 All in all, irrespective of the conceptual difficulties
brought about by this course of action, it seems that including (a small number of)
40 In using this sample split, I assume that being audited by BIG5 auditors also means that the likelihood
of involving such audit firms to assist with BilMoG implementation is higher.
41 When it comes to the identification of the pre- and the post-BilMoG period in the supplemental analyses
that include voluntary BilMoG adopters, the distinction between the pre- and the post-period is determined
relative to the adoption date of the voluntary adopters. This means that if a firm that adopted BilMoG early
in 2009 is matched to an IFRS firm, the matched pair is assigned to the post- rather than the pre-BilMoG
period.
42 To save space, these results are not tabulated. However, they are available in my dissertation (Gross
2015, pp. 93 f.), which includes an earlier version of this paper.
43 Only Model 3 yields a significantly negative post-minus-pre change in absolute differences. Models 1,
2, and 4 show negative but insignificant differences.
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BilMoG early adopters in the full sample and in the selection procedures to form
the industry/size-based matched sample does not substantially change my results.
7 Summary and Concluding Remarks
I empirically test whether the Accounting Law Modernization Act brought account-
ing practices of private German HGB and IFRS firms closer together. This research
question is of interest since prior literature shows that a simultaneous increase in de
facto and de jure comparability is far from being self-evident (Daske et al. 2013;
Cascino and Gassen 2015; Kvaal and Nobes 2010, 2012), which also holds for the
sample of private German firms that I study. Despite opportunities for more similar
reporting choices under HGB and IFRS being existent, HGB rules maintain differ-
ences to IFRS requirements. Moreover, both reporting incentives for and against
more similar reporting practices of private German HGB and IFRS firms can be
identified.
Testing de facto comparability effects of the BilMoG reform by using data from
consolidated reports and output-based measures for the overall comparability of
financial reporting practices, I find that the similarity of accounting practices between
private HGB and IFRS firms follows the increase in de jure comparability induced
by the BilMoG reform. Thus, the reform’s unique legislative focus that aims at
creating an equivalent but lower-cost alternative to IFRS leads to an interesting
de facto comparability outcome: The costs of sincerely adopting new accounting
requirements seem to be sufficiently low so that firms, on average, refrain from
adopting these new requirements in a non-genuine fashion. Thus, increases in de
facto comparability are observable, even if comparability between HGB and IFRS
firms has not been an explicit goal of the reform.
Some limitations should be kept in mind when interpreting my study’s results.
First, generalizability is limited as the BilMoG reform has been a unique accounting
standards change in one country. However, due to the proximity of BilMoG rules
to some IFRS requirements and the distinct low-cost goal of the reform, accounting
standard setters and researchers should find the observed increase in de facto compa-
rability of interest. Second, since I use private firms, all my analyses employ cash-
flow-based comparability measures. Hence, the obtained results could be driven by
the exclusive use of these proxies, even if the results of other studies show that
these measures are good substitutes for other comparability measures (e.g., Barth
et al. 2012). Third, the private firms that I use are not representative of the ma-
jority of private firms in Germany or elsewhere, since the focus on consolidated
reports restricts the sample to larger private firms.44 Fourth, the matching proce-
dures embedded in my research design are based on the assumption that voluntary
IFRS adoption is solely determined by the observable factors used in the respective
matching procedures, which is a strong assumption that might be unjustified. Fifth,
causal inferences are generally difficult to derive in empirical financial accounting
44 However, please note that for my identification strategy this focus is advantageous because these firms
are adequate matches for private firms that voluntarily adopt IFRS.
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research (Gassen 2014). Although my research strategy aims at identifying de facto
comparability effects of the BilMoG reform, I cannot fully preclude that the results
are driven by a confounding event that affects private HGB firms differently from
IFRS firms.
Despite the limitations just mentioned, my study contributes to the literature in
empirical financial accounting in several ways. First, the BilMoG reform affords
a unique opportunity to conduct a quasi-natural experiment on private firms’ adop-
tion of decision-useful accounting standards. Since my study is the first to introduce
the notion of comparability to this stream of literature and the BilMoG reform has
interesting characteristics, my results should particularly be of interest for account-
ing standard setters. Second, I use a slightly modified version of Barth et al.’s
(2012) comparability measurement, which was originally developed in a research
setting for listed firms and could be useful for future empirical research on private
firms’ accounting choices. Finally, my findings provide early empirical evidence
on the German legislature’s attempt to modernize local GAAP using the BilMoG
reform. I find that the legislative actions undertaken are associated with de facto
comparability increases of private German IFRS and HGB firms.
Future research could examine follow-up questions that lie outside the scope of
my study. First, my post-BilMoG sample split with respect to BIG5 audit firms is
but one step to examine the relation between incentives for increased comparability
and de facto comparability outcomes in greater detail; this topic could – apart from
its relevance in the BilMoG setting – even be of more general interest, particularly
since theoretical papers on the mechanisms that drive accounting comparability are
scarce (e.g., Barth et al. 1999; Ray 2011). Second, even if my focus on output-
based comparability measures seems appropriate for capturing overall comparability
effects, empirical evidence on specific accounting areas that changed due to the
BilMoG reform and affected de facto comparability between HGB and IFRS firms
could be of interest for researchers to derive further policy implications.
Data Availability. Data is available from commercial providers (Bureau van Dijk
Amadeus database) and the German Federal Gazette (“Bundesanzeiger”, www.
bundesanzeiger.de).
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Appendix B
Table B Variable definitions (in alphabetical order)
AKTG it A dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if firm i is an “Aktienge-
sellschaft” at time t and zero otherwise.
BIG5 it A dummy variable that equals one if firm i is audited by BDO, Deloitte, Ernst &
Young, KPMG, or PwC at time t.
CAP_INT it This variable stands for the ratio of tangible fixed assets over total assets of firm i
in year t.
CF it, CF it+1 An operating cash flows variable of firm i in year t (t + 1), calculated as earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization less changes in working cap-
ital, scaled by lagged total assets (similarly to Goncharov and Zimmermann 2007,
footnote 6).
d_SIC1 it A dummy variable indicating a specific first-digit SIC industry classification of
firm i in year t.
FO_OWN it A dummy variable that equals one if foreign shareholders are existent and zero
otherwise (as in the paper by Francis et al. 2008).
FO_SUB it Percentage of foreign subsidiaries of firm i, computed as the number of foreign
subsidiaries over the number of all subsidiaries at time t.
GROWTH it Growth is operating revenue of firm i at time t, computed as the ratio of operating
revenues over lagged operating revenues minus one.
IFRS it A dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if firm i reports under IFRS in
year t and zero if it reports under HGB.
IND_GROWTH it Describes the growth in operating revenues for the industry to which firm i be-
longs at time t and is calculated as the two-digit-SIC-based industry median of
GROWTH.
LEV it Leverage of firm i in year t, calculated as the sum of current and noncurrent liabili-
ties over total assets.
NI it Profit or loss (i. e., net income) of firm i in year t, scaled by lagged total assets.
SIC it The Standard Industrial Classification core code as recorded in BvD Amadeus
databases for firm i at time t.
SIC1 it The first digit of firm i’s Standard Industrial Classification core code (as a proxy
for industry affiliation) for firm i at time t.
SIZE it A variable that measures the size of firm i in year t, computed as the natural loga-
rithm of its total assets.
YEAR t A variable that takes a value 2003–2011 dependent on the timing t of the respec-
tive observation.
All unlogged continuous variables, i. e., CAP_INT, CF, FO_SUB, GROWTH, LEV, and NI, are winsorized
at the 1 % level.
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